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Abstract 
This paper explores a model of bond prices where agents have diverse prior beliefs about domestic and 
foreign inﬂation. In the long run, the foreign exchange forward premium reﬂects expected differences in 
inﬂation, but in the short run, it depends upon the diversity of prior beliefs. If some people have diffuse 
priors about a country’s inﬂation process, then its currency commands a forward premium that is eventu­
ally dissipated. Using data on the dollaremark premium from the 1980s, it shows that this kind of diver­
sity really matters. Thus models with a single representative agent give an inadequate description of the 
data. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper takes the idea of heterogeneity in ﬁnancial markets seriously. It develops a theory 
of the foreign exchange forward premium based upon the notion that people in the world econ­
omy have diverse prior beliefs about inﬂation. For most plausible speciﬁcations of prior beliefs, 
agents eventually have completely accurate knowledge about each country’s inﬂation 
processes. Indeed, in the long run, yields reﬂect the common inﬂation forecasts, and the for­
ward premium predicts expected depreciation of the spot rate accurately. Thus the asymptotic 
behavior of the world economy can be modeled using the artiﬁce of a single ‘‘representative 
agent’’ having ‘‘rational expectations’’ about all the ‘‘fundamentals’’ in the world economy. 
But in the short run a fascinating theory of asset prices emerges. This theory has two impor­
tant elements. First, the learning matters. Interest differentials depend upon the stochastic inﬂa­
tion history in the world economy, and the model provides a simple explanation for the 
‘‘forward discount anomaly.’’1 Second, the heterogeneity of beliefs matters. In this paper, I 
will show that it is not enough to ask traders what their inﬂation forecasts are; it is actually 
necessary to ask them how sure they are of their own forecasts. Because different classes of 
agents can hold more or less precise forecasts, bond yields typically have an option value in­
herent in them, even if everyone agrees on expected inﬂation. An asset is worth the sum of 
its expected real stream of income and the option value of reselling it at a later date. This option 
value can never be negative, and it is typically positive. Thus yields are lower than they would 
be if the world economy consisted of a single representative agent. 
Whether this effect is stronger for domestic or foreign assets is at the heart of the theory. One 
implication is that diverse precision of beliefs about a country’s inﬂation process will raise the 
price of its bonds and thus lower their yields. Hence there will be a forward premium for that 
currency. An important insight is that all the moments characterizing agents’ beliefs matter. 
Thus it is not appropriate to consider only each person’s point forecasts of expected inﬂation; 
it matters how precise these forecasts are. 
How does a theory of asset prices emerge in a model where people have diverse prior be­
liefs? In particular, one question arises immediately: Why is this model not plagued by Mil­
grom and Stokey’s (1982) No Trade Theorem? The answer lies in the subtle distinction 
between an environment in which agents have common priors but diverse ex post signals 
and one in which everyone has different priors but observes the same signals. 
Consider, for example, the 500th digit in the decimal representation of e. A speaker walks 
into the seminar room and offers a contract that pays $1 if that digit is 5. I may believe that it is 
likely to be an even number, and you may have more diffuse beliefs. We could easily announce 
our priors (thus establishing common knowledge), and we would both agree that you would pay 
more for the contract than I would.2 Then the speaker opens a laptop and begins to read off 
numbers from the Taylor series expansion: 1.0, 2.0, 2.5, 2.67, and so on. After each new num­
ber, the speaker allows us to trade. It is quite possible that you and I would be willing to do so, 
with perhaps especially active trading once we get near the n-th term, where n! z 10501. Thus 
the existence of a market (with limited short selling) where agents have heterogeneous priors is 
completely consistent with equilibrium. 
Now think of a similar situation, but the speaker announces that he is willing to sell for $1 
a contract that pays $1000 if the 500th digit in the decimal expansion of e is not 5. He then takes 
out his laptop and boots up. No matter what your priors were, you would be unwilling to buy 
that asset precisely because the speaker has shown he has received a superior signal about its 
1 See Engel (1996) for a good discussion. 
2 Of course, I might want to short that contract to the greatest extent possible, but we would both agree that some limit 
on my position is warranted because I have limited wealth. Likewise, you might like to go arbitrarily long, but your 
position too will be ﬁnite in practice. It will become apparent below that a limited short-selling assumption is necessary 
for equilibrium to exist in this kind of market. 
value. Now differential information destroys the very existence of equilibrium. What is the es­
sence of the difference between the two examples? In the ﬁrst case, all the priors are common 
knowledge and so are all the public signals. But in the second case, even if the prior beliefs are 
common knowledge, the signals are not. 
The model developed in Section 3 is akin to the ﬁrst example. The analysis builds upon the 
work of Harrison and Kreps (1978), who showed that the asset’s price typically exceeded the 
valuation of the most bullish trader. They stated that this was a formalization of Keynes’s notion 
of a beauty contest. Morris (1996) extended this work to incorporate learning in a Bayesian 
framework, and Fisher (2003) extended his model to explain asset bubbles that arose in the for­
eign exchange experiments reported in Fisher and Kelly (2000). 
This paper makes four contributions. First, it applies Morris’s (1996) work by building 
a model of bonds and extends it by incorporating more general stochastic processes. Second, 
it is a completely novel analysis of the foreign exchange forward premium. To the best of 
my knowledge, no one has built or calibrated a model like this in international ﬁnance. Third, 
the model’s calibration and estimation shows that plausible priors can explain some of the for­
ward premium for the German mark during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. That period and that cur­
rency were chosen to complement Lewis (1989) impressive empirical analysis using Bayesian 
techniques of a reduced form model of the exchange rate. Fourth, I actually estimate the pre­
cision with which different classes of agents hold plausible prior beliefs; then I show that there 
is strong evidence in favor of a model with diversity of beliefs. The typical homogeneous agent 
model in macroeconomics is just not supported by the data. 
What are this paper’s main results? First, it shows that diverse prior beliefs about a country’s 
inﬂation process induce a forward premium for its currency at horizons greater than one month. 
Second, it shows that the ‘‘peso problem’’ is not as simple as has been assumed; indeed, the 
typical interpretation of this phenomenon imposes very severe restrictions on agents’ beliefs. 
Third, it gives a simple explanation for a strong version of the forward discount anomaly. 
When there is diverse prior information about a country’s inﬂation process, its one-month for­
ward rate will be negatively correlated with realized depreciations. Fourth, the model is cali­
brated and then estimated using actual data from the United States and Germany during the 
1980s. The model performs well enough, although the effect of informational heterogeneity 
on the forward premium is not large. The calibrations of the model outperform a simple bench­
mark based upon covered interest parity, and they show that diversity of prior beliefs improves 
the model’s ﬁt. Fifth, I use a non-linear regression to test for homogeneity of beliefs in the data, 
and the Wald test overwhelmingly rejects the workhorse model in international ﬁnance. Diver­
sity of beliefs really matters in these data. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a simple but extended example 
because the model is strikingly different from the norm in international ﬁnance. Section 3 con­
tains a formal description of the model, and Section 4 discusses the forward premium both 
when there is one representative agent and when there are several agents in the world economy. 
Section 5 calibrates and then estimates the model for plausible speciﬁcation of the agents’ prior 
beliefs. It also shows that the models’ predictions give rise to the forward premium anomaly. 
Section 6 gives some brief conclusions. 
2. A simple example 
Consider two zero-coupon bonds maturing in two years, one denominated in dollars, the 
other in euros, and each with a face value of 100. These two bonds are identical in every 
Table 1 
Conjugate priors 
Prior beliefs about American inﬂation Prior beliefs about European inﬂation 
Type 1 agents a ¼ 100; b ¼ 100 a ¼ 100; b ¼ 100
 
Type 2 agents a ¼ 100; b ¼ 100 a ¼ 0:01; b ¼ 0:01
 
waydwith respect to risk, liquidity, and other relevant factorsdbut differ solely in their cur­
rency of denomination. American inﬂation can take on one of the two values: 0% or 8%. Eu­
ropean inﬂation can assume the same two values. Thus the inﬂation rate in either country is 
a binomial random variable. To make things very simple, we will slow down economic time 
and assume that information relevant to inﬂation forecasts arrives only once a year. 
There are two classes of agents in the world economy, and each has unbiased beliefs about 
domestic and foreign inﬂation rates. Everyone is risk neutral and has very precise beliefs about 
American inﬂation. But one class of agents has much less precise beliefs about European in­
ﬂation. Table 1 summarizes the relevant priors.3 
A Type 2 agent is essentially a frequentist about European monetary policy: his posterior 
beliefs will reﬂect the history of European inﬂation almost exactly. 
Agents discount felicity with the common factor d ¼ 0.97 z 1/1.03. Since they are risk neu­
tral and may hold different beliefs, it is natural to impose that there is limited short selling and 
to assume that there is sufﬁcient liquidity in the market to price the current stock of assets. Let 
b(s, t) be the price of a dollar bond when there have been s years of high American inﬂation 
during the ﬁrst t years; the notation b*(s, t) is analogous for the instrument denominated in 
euros. These bonds can be priced using backward induction. 
Consider the dollar-denominated asset. In the second year, if inﬂation in the United States 
was low in the ﬁrst year, then everyone’s posterior beliefs are such that: 
bð0; 1Þ ¼  d½ð101=201Þ100 þ ð100=201Þð100=1:08Þ�z93:42: 
On the other hand, if there has been high inﬂation in the United States, then: 
bð1; 1Þ ¼  d½ð100=201Þ100 þ ð101=201Þð100=1:08Þ�z93:39: 
This slightly lower price and higher yield reﬂect higher expected American inﬂation. Thus both 
classes of agents will agree at the null history that the dollar bond will cost: 
bð0; 0Þ ¼  d½ð1=2Þbð0; 1Þ þ ð1=2Þbð1; 1Þ=1:08�z87:25: 
Pricing the euro bond is not quite as simple. If there has been low European inﬂation in pe­
riod 1, then Type 2 agents will be bullish about European inﬂation and will hold all the euro-
denominated assets. Thus: 
b�ð0; 1Þ ¼  d½ð1:01=1:02Þ100 þ ð0:01=1:02Þð100=1:08Þ�z96:93: 
3 DeGroot (1970, p. 40) shows that the natural family of conjugate priors is the beta distribution. This distribution has 
two parameters a > 0 and b > 0, and its density function is f ðxÞ ¼ ½Gða þ bÞ=GðaÞGðbÞ�xa�1ð1 � xÞb�1 if 0 < x < 1 
and f ðxÞ ¼ 0 otherwise, where GðaÞ is the gamma function. The mean of this random variable is a=ða þ bÞ; and its 
variance is ab=ða þ bÞ2ða þ b þ 1Þ. 
But if there has been high inﬂation in Europe, then only Type 1 of agents will hold the Euro­
pean bonds, and they will pay: 
b�ð1; 1Þ ¼ d½ð100=201Þ100 þ ð101=201Þð100=1:08Þ�z93:39: 
Thus at the null history everyone will agree that the initial price of euro bonds is: 
b�ð0; 0Þ ¼ d2½ð1=2Þb�ð0; 1Þ þ ð1=2Þb�ð1; 1Þ=1:08�z88:95: 
The initial yield on European bonds is lower than that in American, even though at the null 
history everyone in the world economy expects that the American and European inﬂation rates 
will be identical. The euro trades at a premium because some agents have less precise beliefs 
about European inﬂation than others. 
Of course, the difference between American and European yields is the two-year forward 
premium on the euro. Now let f (s,s*;T � t) be the T � t year forward premium when there 
have been s years of high American inﬂation and s* years of high European inﬂation during 
the ﬁrst t years of a pair of bonds that mature in year T. A simple approximation shows that 
the two-year euro forward premium at the null history is: 
f ð0; 0; 2Þzðln 0:9454 � ln 0:9273Þ=2z0:97% 
per annum. The euro trades two years forward at a premium simply because the market has 
more diverse beliefs about European inﬂation. Still, the difference between the yields on 
one-year dollar and euro bonds at the null history would be: 
f ð0; 0; 1Þ ¼ 0:0%; 
since everyone expects the same inﬂation rate for America and Europe. 
For simplicity, impose that purchasing power parity holds after any history, and thus the 
nominal depreciation of the dollar reﬂects the realized inﬂation differential. Assume further 
that the realizations of American and European inﬂation are described by independent binomial 
random variables with equi-probable outcomes.4 Then, at the null history, the one-year forward 
rate is an unbiased predictor of the expected depreciation. Still, at long horizons, the forward 
discount is a biased predictor of exchange rate changes even though all agents are risk neutral. 
The remarkable aspect of this example is that everyone has unbiased inﬂation expectations for 
every country and there is no expected inﬂation differential. But there is a premium on euro-
denominated assets simply because some agents have less precise beliefs about the future 
path of European inﬂation. Thus the long euro trades at a premium since the option value of 
reselling European bonds is not negligible. 
Let me conclude this extended example by mentioning an important fact that is true in 
a much more general framework. The forward premium arises in a ﬁnancial model with ‘‘cli­
entele effects.’’ In particular, some assets are held by only a subset of the agents after some 
histories. There would be no option value to holding a bond denominated in any currency if 
everyone always held the same portfolio all the time. 
4 If every agent has unbiased beliefs, we are implicitly imposing the equilibrium condition that a ¼ b. 
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3. The model 
This section shows how this example generalizes. Assume again that all the agents in world 
ﬁnancial markets are risk neutral. It is possible to allow each person to discount streams of fu­
ture utility at the idiosyncratic rate di. A bond dominated in domestic currency has par value V, 
matures in T � 1 month, and pays semi-annual coupons c/2, all denominated in units of the do­
mestic currency. Even though these are ‘‘risk-free’’ assets, they are claims to nominal streams 
of income and thus are subject to inﬂation risk. Foreign bonds of the same maturity have par 
value V* and pay an analogous coupon of c*/2, both denominated in foreign currency. 
The domestic inﬂation rate is an independent and identically distributed stochastic process 
with ﬁnite support. Let p be a random variable with support P ¼ fp1; .; pkg
p occurs, and q ¼ ðq1; .; qkÞ. It is appropriate to think of each ~
~ , qj be the prob­
ability that the j-th realization of
period as a month, the highest frequency at which relevant price data are generally available. 
�, its support P� ¼ p1; .; pThe random variable for foreign inﬂation , and the concom­p 
itant probabilities q � ¼ q1; .; qk� are all analogous. 
~
World ﬁnancial markets consist of several different classes of agents. The representative 
agent from each class has idiosyncratic priors about the inﬂation processes in each of the 
two countries. Let Dk be the relevant simplex; then the measurable function ri : D
k/½0; 1� de­
notes the i-th agent’s prior beliefs about the inﬂation rates of the domestic country and 
� : Dk
� 
r /½0; 1� represents that person’s prior beliefs about inﬂation in the foreign country. i 
The assumption that there are different classes of agents allows one to analyze price-taking equi­
libria, but since the agents may have different priors about world inﬂation processes, there may be 
no equilibrium unless a limited short-selling constraint is imposed. This is perhaps not an unreal­
istic assumption about actual ﬁnancial markets, but it has profound implications for the nature of 
the equilibrium in this model. The descriptions of inﬂation and beliefs are quite general.     
k� 
The inﬂation proﬁles in each country are the relevant history. Thus ht ¼ ~~~~p1;p pt;p 
be a vector denoting the 
; .;1 t0
is a history of length 0 � t � T. Now let nðhtÞ ¼ ðn1ðhtÞ; .; nkðhtÞÞ
number of times each different level of domestic inﬂation has been observed in history ht . 
Of course, nðhtÞ is the sufﬁcient statistic for estimating the home inﬂation process and  0 
n�ðhtÞ ¼  n ðhtÞ; .; nk� ðhtÞ is analogous for the foreign inﬂation.5 The null histories are1
h0 � h0such that n ¼ ð0; .; 0Þ0 and n ¼ ð0; .; 0Þ0 . 
An agent’s posteriors about the process driving domestic inﬂation are: 
ðq1Þn1 /ðqk Þnk riðqÞ 
4iðqjhtÞ ¼ R : ðx1Þn1 /ðxk Þnk riðxÞdx 
Likewise, the i-th agent’s posterior beliefs about foreign inﬂation are: 
� n1 / � 
n
k� � �q q r ðq Þ� 1 k� i4� � �ðq jht Þ ¼ R : 
k�i ðx1Þn1 /ðxkÞn r� i ðxÞdx 
Both integrals are taken over the relevant simplexes. In essence, these posteriors represent the 
agent’s model of the inﬂation process, given the common history that everyone has observed. If 
5 These statistics are sufﬁcient only because I have assumed that the inﬂation processes are i.i.d. In reality, inﬂation is 
obviously quite persistent. This will be a major foible in the model’s empirical implementation. 
   
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  
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the priors are well behaved, these posteriors converge to the true processes, but the speed of 
convergence depends upon the precision of initial beliefs. 
Deﬁne an indicator function 
pj if x ¼ 0; .; qj; .; 0 zðxÞ ¼  : 
0 otherwise 
Then a representative agent’s forecast of expected domestic inﬂation is: 
ZZ 
p iðhtÞ ¼  4iðqjht ÞzðxÞdq dx: 
Likewise, a typical forecast of foreign inﬂation is: 
ZZ 
p�ðht Þ ¼  4�ðq �jhtÞz �ðxÞdq � dx;i i 
where all the variables and the indicator function are analogous. In each of these formulas, the 
inner integral is taken with respect to a person’s prior beliefs and the outer integral is taken with 
respect to realized inﬂation rates. Thus this model allows for a natural generalization of ex­
pected inﬂation where agents have heterogeneous priors about the mechanics of monetary 
policy. 
Let the pricing kernel g : Dk/Rþ have the rule 
b n1; .; nj þ 1; .; nk if x ¼ 0; .; qj ; .; 0 gðxÞ ¼  ;
0 otherwise 
where b n1; .; nj þ 1; .; nk is the price of a domestic bond when the successor to history ht 
has n htþ1 ¼ n1ðhtÞ; .; njðhtÞ þ 1; .; nkðhtÞ . Then the price of a domestic bond satisﬁes 
the recursion: 
ZZ 
4iðqjhtÞ½c=12 þ gðxÞ� bðhtÞ ¼ maxi di dq dx ;
1 þ zðxÞ 
where c=12 captures the fact that a pro-rated share of the semi-annual coupon is paid implicitly 
each month. The price of a foreign bond likewise satisﬁes: 
 ZZ �  4�ðq jhtÞ½c�=12 þ g�ðxÞ� 
b�ðhtÞ ¼ maxi di i dq � dx : 
1 þ z�ðxÞ 
These recursive formulae are at the crux of the model of the forward premium. They state 
a bond sells for what that most bullish class of agents will pay for it. This price is the expected 
present value of the pro-rated coupon and capital gains. But each agent’s expectations depend 
upon prior beliefs about the relevant country’s inﬂation process. 
After history ht, the T � t forward discount on domestic currency is given by the difference 
between home and foreign yields. Thus 
1=ðT�tÞ
f ðht; T � tÞ ¼ ðb�ðhtÞ=bðht ÞÞ
is the forward discount in percent per annum for a contract maturing at T. 
  
� 
A simple description of the spot exchange rate closes the model. Let the domestic and for­
� h0eign price levels at the null history be p(h0) ¼ 1 and p ¼ 1; for any other history, the price Q Q   t t �levels are pðhtÞ ¼ ð1 þ p~sÞ and p�ðhtÞ ¼ 1 þ p~ . Imposing heroically that the real s¼1 s¼1 s 
exchange is constant,6 we see that the spot exchange rate is: 
eðhtÞ ¼ pðhtÞ=p �ðhtÞ: 
This deﬁnition follows the American convention: the exchange rate is denominated in units 
of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange. Since domestic and foreign inﬂation pro­
cesses are independent multinomial random variables, the log of the spot exchange rate has 
a unit root. This model of the spot rate is unrealistic in the extreme, having little to recommend 
it other than analytical simplicity. Still, the actual rate of depreciation reﬂects the historical in­
ﬂation differential, and purchasing power parity holds identically in every period. 
4. The behavior of the forward premium 
The forward premium will depend in general upon all the prior beliefs and the stochastic real­
izations of the inﬂation proﬁles in the world economy. If rið$Þ and r ð$Þ are well behaved for i 
every agent, then the posteriors will converge to the true inﬂation processes. Thus, after a sufﬁ­
ciently long history, the forward premium at any horizon will eventually reﬂect the expected in­
ﬂation differential.7 Since all the posterior beliefs converge to the true inﬂation proﬁles, it is 
appropriate to speak of ‘‘the inﬂation differential,’’ and the most patient classes of agents will 
set the prices of domestic and foreign bonds. Then covered interest parity will insure that the 
expected depreciation of the domestic currency reﬂects the domestic inﬂation differential. 
During the early periods, the forward premium is determined by the conﬁguration of priors 
and by the (stochastic) initial realizations of the inﬂation. In general, the forward rate is not 
a Martingale. The easiest way to see this is to note that each agent’s valuation of any bond de­
pends upon both his priors and the history of inﬂation in both countries. The expected value of 
any stream of incomedand thus the forward rate at all horizonsdis not independent of history. 
Hence the spot exchange rate and the forward premium will be correlated in the early periods. 
A general description of the forward premium is quite involved, and it is appropriate to consider 
two separate cases. I will ﬁrst analyze the case with one representative agent in the world econ­
omy. Then I will discuss the general case with several agents. 
4.1. One representative agent 
Consider the situation in which one agent has prior beliefs rðqÞ and r �ðq �Þ about the pro­
cesses driving domestic and foreign inﬂation. There is no reason to require these beliefs to 
be unbiased, and there are no simple restrictions that might be imposed upon their correlation. 
Assume that the representative agent has the same subjective expected inﬂation for the domes­
tic and foreign central banks. Then, abstracting from Siegel’s paradox, expected depreciation will 
be zero since both domestic and foreign bonds will be discounted identically. Still, the early his­
tory of inﬂation will have a strong effect on the forward premium, especially if either rðqÞ or 
6 This assumption is not idle; it is the only way of ensuring that a risk-neutral agent is indifferent between holding 
domestic and foreign bonds after any history. 
7 Still, the bond pricing formulae exhibit Siegel’s (1972) paradox. 
  � � � 
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r �ðq �Þ are diffuse. For example, if there is an initial (random) spell of low inﬂation in the home 
country, the domestic yields will drop and foreign exchange will trade forward at a discount. Since 
yields reﬂect expected inﬂation, early realizations of the inﬂation process are doubly important for 
bonds with a long horizon. First, they occur when the agent’s beliefs have the least precision. Sec­
ond, the movements in the price of long bonds are ampliﬁed since their time to maturity is distant. 
Thus the forward premium at long horizons will be quite volatile initially. 
What if the subjective probabilities are biased? Then the country with the higher subjective 
expected inﬂation has a bond that trades at a steep discount and a correspondingly high yield. 
Hence that country’s currency will trade at a forward discount. In the long run, the actual real­
izations of the inﬂation rate will reﬂect the true underlying monetary process. The econometri­
cian will observe a secular change in the forward premium that is not justiﬁed by the actual 
historical inﬂation differential. If the original priors are quite diffuse, then the period of learning 
will be fairly rapid, and the forward premium will forecast the actual rate of depreciation of the 
spot exchange rate after only a short time. But if the (incorrect) prior beliefs about either coun­
try have a high degree of precision, then the econometrician would see a very long period dur­
ing which the forward premium was a biased predictor of changes in the spot rate. 
4.2. Several types of agents 
If there are several heterogeneous agents in the world economy, then a fascinating theory of 
asset prices emerges. First, all of the elements of learning are still present. Second, the hetero­
geneity of beliefs also matters. In particular, the price of a bond now reﬂects both the subjective 
expected present value of its cash ﬂow and the option value of reselling it after some future 
history. Hence a currency will trade at a forward premium if there is a wide diversity of opinion 
about that country’s inﬂation process. Since foreign exchange is traded forward at one month, 
three months, six months, and a year, this option value is highest for forward rates at longer 
horizons. Also, the one-month forward rate will not include a component having to do with 
the heterogeneity of beliefs. 
It is easiest to illustrate these ideas by imposing in the rest of this subsection that agents have 
conjugate prior beliefs about the actual inﬂation and have identical subjective discount factors. 
Assume that agent i has conjugate priors described by Dirichlet distributions with parameters 
ai ¼ ai;1; .; ai;k and a ¼ ðai;1; .; ai;k�Þ.8 Again, P is the vector of possible domestic inﬂa­i 
tion rates and P* be analogous. Then this person’s expectations about domestic and foreign 
inﬂation at the null history are: 
     00 � � �h0 h0 P� ¼ ðaiÞ and p ¼ a =a ;pi P=ai;0 i i i;0
Pkwhere ai;0 ¼ j¼1 ai;j measures the precision of his beliefs about domestic inﬂation and a ¼i;0 Pk� � is analogous. This person’s posteriors induce these inﬂation forecasts: j¼1 ai;j 
0  �ðhtÞ 0 P� p iðhtÞ ¼ ðai þ nðht ÞÞP=ðai;0 þ tÞ and p ðhtÞ ¼  a þ n =ða þ tÞ:i i i;0 
8 See DeGroot (1970), p. 174. This distribution is the natural conjugate for the multinomial, and it is a generalization 
of the beta distribution. The i-th agent believes that the prior probability of the k-th event is ai;k =ai;0, and he believes that   2  
the variance of this outcome is ai;k ai;0 � ai;k ai;0 ai;0 þ 1 . If  ai;0z0, then this agent has non-informative priors. 
  
  
  
The ﬁrst important fact is that if all the agents’ priors have the same precision, then the agent 
who is initially most bullish about a country’s inﬂation prospects will always be so. This agent 
will always hold that country’s bonds, and there will be no option value inherent in 
bonds denominated in its currency at long horizons. Here’s why. Let i be such that 
p i h
0 ¼ minjfa 0P=aj;0g. Since all the priors about domestic inﬂation have the same precision, j
we may put ai;0 ¼ a0. But then 
p iðhtÞ ¼ ðai þ nðhtÞÞ0P=ða0 þ tÞ: 
Hence the ranking of the agents’ expected inﬂation forecasts does not change since they all ob­
serve the same history. Then a simple argument using backward induction from any terminal history 
shows that this agent will pay the most for the bond denominated in the domestic currency. Of 
course, the same is true for the class of agents that is most bullish about foreign inﬂation, even though 
the relevant precision about that process may be different. Thus no bond price will have any option 
value inherent in it, and the forward rate at any horizon will reﬂect a simple learning process. 
This observation has important implications for the forward premium. Only when agents’ 
prior beliefs are of different precision will a bond have a lower yield than that forecast by 
the most bullish group in the world economy.9 In other words, the higher moments of the priors 
matter in a model with limited short selling, an illustration of Morris’s (1996) switching con­
dition for this model. Thus, if people in the world economy have unbiased but heterogeneous 
beliefs about a country’s inﬂation prospects, then its bonds will have a relatively low yield, and 
its currency will trade forward at a premium. 
Now consider the polar case where at least two agents’ prior beliefs have different precision 
but all the agents have the same initial forecasts for domestic inﬂation. Thus p i h
0 ¼ p and there 
is a class of agents with the least precise beliefs; let these priors have precision ai,0. Likewise, the 
agents with the most precise beliefs have priors with precision aj;0 > ai;0. A second important 
fact is that only these two classes of agents will ever hold the domestic bond, and there is a simple 
way of describing who holds these bonds when. The agents with the most precise priors hold do­
mestic bonds if and only if the history has been such that P0 nðhtÞ=t > p. In other words, the 
agents with the most precise prior beliefs hold domestic bonds when average domestic inﬂation 
has been high, and those with the least precise beliefs hold them when it has been low. 
Here’s why this fact is true. One can always write the posteriors as: 
ai;0p t P
0 nðhtÞ=t 
p iðhtÞ ¼  þ :
 
ai;0 þ t ai;0 þ t
 
Thus anyone’s posterior beliefs are a weighted average of the common prior expected inﬂation and 
the commonly observed average history of domestic inﬂation. Now consider the partial derivative: 
p � nðht Þ0P=t 
vp iðhtÞ=vai;0 ¼ t 2 :
 ðai þ tÞ
0 
9 A colleague’s comments helped me hammer this point home more forcefully. Imagine testing my ideas using survey 
data on inﬂation expectations. It is not enough to calculate the dispersion of point forecasts among different classes of 
traders. Instead, it is necessary to get data on how sure each agent was about his or her forecast. Since inﬂation surveys 
typically do not collect this kind of information, one must make a strong statistical assumption linking dispersion of 
forecasts among agents with the degree to which some of them felt that their subjective beliefs were imprecise. 
  
0
Thus this posterior is increasing if and only if p � nðhtÞP=t > 0. In other words, when in­
ﬂation has been low, the agents with the least precise beliefs are most bullish about domestic 
bonds; otherwise the agents with the most precise beliefs are most bullish. An implication is 
that even if average inﬂation converges in probability toward the common prior p i h
0 ¼ p, 
there will almost surely be trade in domestic bonds after any ﬁnite horizon. 
This discussion provides a simple explanation of the ‘‘forward premium anomaly.’’ If 
agents have heterogeneous beliefs, then the forward premium will depend upon the stochastic 
history of the world economydeven when everyone has unbiased priors about the inﬂation 
differential and expected movements in the spot exchange rate. Consider the simple case 
when the foreign inﬂation process is known and thus everyone has perfectly precise and un­
biased prior beliefs about foreign inﬂation. Assume also that there are two types of agents 
with unbiased beliefs about domestic inﬂation; one group has very precise priors and the other 
has imprecise ones. At the null history, everyone expects the spot exchange rate to depreciate 
according to the common expected inﬂation differential. After a history of high home inﬂa­
tion, only people with precise priors would hold home bonds. Thus short-term interest 
ratesdbased upon asset prices for which the option value of eventual resale is negligi­
bledwould still reﬂect the actual expected inﬂation differential, and the one-period forward 
premium would not be correlated with future depreciations. But after a history of low home 
inﬂation, the agents with imprecise priors hold domestic bonds and the interest differential 
would be lower than the actual expected inﬂation differential. Thus the one-period forward 
premium would indicate an expected appreciation that would not happen on average. Hence 
there is a negative correlation between actual depreciations and the one-period forward 
premium. 
Thus there is an ineluctable interaction between each agent’s expectations about the inﬂation 
processes and the degrees of precision that characterize his beliefs. Also, the volatility of the 
forward premium depends upon the precision of these prior beliefs. When there is less preci­
sion, there is greater volatility of bond prices and a larger reaction of the forward premium 
at long horizons. This premium will exhibit conditional heteroscedasticity since periods of 
high volatility are bunched together as agents are learning about the true inﬂation processes 
in the initial periods of the world economy. 
The volatility of the forward premium will also be higher if there are diffuse priors about 
a bond that has low coupon payments. Since such a bond has a relatively long duration, small 
changes in expected inﬂation have large effects on yields. Thus the forward premium will move 
signiﬁcantly with the advent of news relevant to forecasting inﬂation. 
This model of the forward premium also has important implications for the ‘‘peso problem,’’ 
ﬁrst described in an analytical framework by Krasker (1980). When will a country’s currency 
trade at a forward discount for a sustained period, even if the econometrician has observed no 
large depreciation of the spot rate? One obvious possibility is that agents anticipate a large de­
valuation that occurs with a small probability; in this model, that notion corresponds to an el­
ement in the support of a country’s inﬂation process that is very large but which may have small 
weight. But it is obvious that the ‘‘peso problem’’ endures only when all classes of agents have 
high precision about a small probability event, an unlikely situation indeed. Instead, it is quite 
plausible that people have diffuse priors about the monetary policy of a central bank undertak­
ing a new regime of price stabilization. This diversity of beliefs would tend to keep the forward 
currency strong, and learning would tend to undercut any initial fear of hyperinﬂation. Thus the 
forward discount reﬂects both the lack of conﬁdence in the inﬂation reduction scheme and the 
degree of conformity in traders’ beliefs. 
5. The model and the data 
This section accomplishes three goals. First, it describes the data from an important period in 
recent monetary history during which the dollar traded forward at a discount, even though it 
continued to appreciate on the spot market for almost ﬁve years. Second, it shows in detail 
how the model was calibrated. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the ﬁrst attempts 
at calibrating a model in which the diversity of prior beliefs has substantial empirical bite. 
Third, it actually estimates the model in two different ways and shows that diversity of prior 
beliefs may well characterize the data. Again, I believe this is the ﬁrst time that an economic 
model in macroeconomics or ﬁnance with heterogeneous beliefs has been estimated and then 
tested.10 
5.1. Data on the dollaremark forward premium and the relevant inﬂation rates 
Fig. 1 presents monthly data on the mark forward premium at different horizons during the 
ﬁrst half of the 1980s. This was a period during which it was common for the dollar to trade 
forward at a discount, although there was a continued appreciation of the dollar until after the 
Plaza Accord in September 1985. This episode of international monetary history gave rise to 
a large literature on the foreign exchange risk premium. Two facts are salient. First, the dollar 
was trading forward at a discount during this entire period. Second, the actual change in the 
spot exchange rate was an order of magnitude larger than the forward premium, and the forward 
premium was the wrong sign during most of this period. Two other facts are worth emphasiz­
ing. First, the forward premia at different horizons are highly correlated. Second, all the premia 
were much more volatile at the beginning of this period, when Paul Volcker became chair of the 
Federal Reserve Board, than at the end, when a successful disinﬂation had been undertaken. 
The next step is to gather data on the actual inﬂation rates of Germany and the United States 
during those ﬁve years.11 The median rates of consumer price inﬂation, calculated from the 60 
annualized monthly changes, were 3.2% in Germany and 3.8% in the United States. The data 
generating processes for these time series presumably have continuous support, but the model is 
analytical and computationally tractable only for a multinomial distribution. Indeed, the model 
implies that all the moments of the processes describing beliefs about inﬂation matter, and I had 
to make a choice about how best to model the inﬂation processes using multinomial 
10 Using proprietary survey data, Elliott and Ito (1999) demonstrate that there is a diversity of beliefs in these markets. 
But they do not estimate an economic model where diversity matters. Chavas (2000) studies the U.S. beef market and 
shows that a signiﬁcant fraction of suppliers have na€ıve expectations about price formation, but he did not develop 
a full-ﬂedged model of informational heterogeneity. In his own vocabulary, traders ‘‘within each information group’’ 
are rational, but they are implicitly blissfully unaware of the forecasters of other types of suppliers. Baak (1999) studies 
the same market and uses a different econometric technique to estimate the fraction of ‘‘boundedly rational’’ agents. 
Again, this model of a market is not really fully speciﬁed because it lacks an explicit description of what constitutes 
common knowledge among all agents. 
11 I used the BLS series for all urban consumers (all items) not seasonally adjusted for American prices. The data on 
German prices are completely analogous, and they come from the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. The spot ex­
change rate and forward premium were given to me in private correspondence by Nelson Mark. They were originally 
weekly data, and I chose the ﬁrst week of each month to constitute the relevant monthly data. The interested reader will 
ﬁnd all the data used in this paper at http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/eﬁsher/Dollar_Mark_Historical.xls. They span 
the period was from March 1973 (the beginning of the modern era of ﬂoating exchange rates) through December 1985 
(three months after the Plaza Accord). 
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Fig. 1. The data (January 1981eDecember 1985). 
distributions with discrete supports. Truth in advertising dictates that I should emphasize again 
that the assumption of independently and identically distributed data generating processes is 
probably at least as problematic as assuming discrete supports. The correlation between current 
inﬂation and inﬂation in near months has serious implications for the efﬁciency of the Method 
of Simulated Moments estimator. 
Table 2 shows a tractable histogram describing the distributions of the actual inﬂation rates. 
These data were used in the simulations. 
Why did I choose histograms with ﬁve bins? One needs a model with at least three bins to 
have independent measures of the ﬁrst two moments of the inﬂation process, and I though that 
higher moments also might matter. In brief, I classiﬁed the actual inﬂation histories for the two 
countries using these discrete data.12 Even with this simple structure for domestic and foreign 
inﬂation, there are 4368 possible histories during the 12 months before a one-year forward con­
tract matures.13 The simulations are computationally complex, although feasible on a personal 
computer with a Pentium chip. 
It is worth emphasizing that nowhere did I use the data on the spot exchange rate in calibrat­
ing the model. Indeed, I am trying to build and evaluate a model of the forward premium, not 
one of the spot market where purchasing power parity is imposed after every possible history. I 
am thankful for this small mercy! 
12 There is a practical problem lurking in these discrete supports. The support for the American inﬂation process is 
more dispersed than that for German inﬂation. The model indicates that forward premia will depend upon inﬂation ex­
pectations along all possible histories, even those not realized in the data. Thus Siegel’s paradox will tend to make dol­
lar-denominated bonds more valuable, especially at long horizons. The implied American yields will be lower than 
would if the two inﬂation processes had identical discrete supports. 
13 The degree of computational complexity becomes especially daunting for the Method of Simulated Moments esti­
mators. In that case, I used 50 random histories and a numerical algorithm that searches through a two-dimensional 
parameter space; an iteration takes around 10 min on a fast laptop, and the algorithm converges in around 6 h from 
an initial starting value for the parameters. 
  
 Table 2 
Discrete distributions of consumer price inﬂation, 1981 through 1985 
Germany United States 
Support (%) Frequency (%) Support (%) Frequency (%) 
�4 2 �5 2 
0  10  0  8
4  70  5  67
9  15  11  18
12 3 14 5 
5.2. How to simulate the model 
Since the model has predictions for the forward premium at each horizon, I have 240 pieces 
of data that I am trying to ﬁt with a parsimonious parameterization. The theory in Section 4 
indicates that a model with only two classes of agents is already quite interesting, and consid­
erations of scientiﬁc elegance and computational tractability led me to impose that restriction. 
When both agents have identical priors, the simulation captures the typical representative agent 
assumption in ﬁnance, albeit with an element of Bayesian learning. When the agents have dif­
ferent priors, the heterogeneity of beliefs is important, and measuring this effect is my primary 
empirical contribution. 
Here are the broad strokes of how to simulate the model. Each simulation begins by spec­
ifying both agents’ prior beliefs about the American and German inﬂation processes. In keeping 
with the spirit of Bayesian analysis, these beliefs need not even be proper distributions; indeed, 
any ﬁve non-negative numbers has an interpretation as a Dirichlet distribution with a certain 
precision. Then, sequentially for each of the 60 periods in the data, dollar-denominated bonds 
and mark-denominated bonds are priced, feeding the program the actual realizations of the (dis­
crete) inﬂation processes as the ﬁve-year history after December 1980 unfolds. Of course, all 
four prior distributions are updated appropriately using the actual history. Each agent has his 
own subjective valuation of American and German yields, and the model prices American 
and German bonds after every history, using the relevant subjective evaluations about all pos­
sible future histories until the bonds mature. Finally, each simulation spits out the dollar pre­
mium at the relevant four horizons in every period as the actual history unfolds. The 
simulations all impose that the discount factor for each class of agents is 0.97 and that domestic 
and foreign assets are both zero-coupon bonds. 
5.3. Method of Simulated Moments estimation 
The model with two representative agents has 22 parameters: each agent has ﬁve parameters 
that describe prior beliefs about the American inﬂation process, ﬁve others that characterize the 
German inﬂation processes, and a subjective discount factor. The model is a complicated map­
ping from these parameters to predictions about the data. 
It is appropriate to keep the estimation of the model as simple as possible, for reasons of both 
analytical elegance and empirical tractability. First, I imposed that the two agents had identical 
discount factors d1 ¼ d2 ¼ 0:97; it is notoriously difﬁcult to estimate these parameters accurately, 
and I am already conducting an unorthodox empirical analysis. Second, I examined only two 
kinds of prior beliefs. Table 3 summarizes the non-sample restrictions that I have imposed. 
� 
 
 � 	 
Table 3 
Non-sample information and estimated parameters 
First class of agents Second class of agents 
Discount factor d1 ¼ 0:97 d2 ¼ 0:97 
Case of strongly rational expectations 
Beliefs about American inﬂation a1 ¼ b1 � ð0:02; 0:08; 0:67; 0:18; 0:05Þ0 a2 ¼ b2 � ð0:02; 0:08; 0:67; 0:18; 0:05Þ0 
Beliefs about German inﬂation a � 1 ¼ b3 � ð0:02; 0:1; 0:7; 0:15; 0:03Þ0 a � 2 ¼ b4 � ð0:02; 0:1; 0:7; 0:15; 0:03Þ0 
Case of Bayesian adaptive expectations 
Beliefs about American inﬂation a1 ¼ b1 � ð0; 0:05; 0:365; 0:365; 0:22Þ# a2 ¼ b2 � ð0; 0:05; 0:365; 0:365; 0:22Þ0 
Beliefs about German inﬂation a � 1 ¼ b3 � ð0:02; 0:23; 0:47; 0:2; 0:08Þ0 a � 2 ¼ b4 � ð0:02; 0:23; 0:47; 0:2; 0:08Þ0 
Two separate cases were estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments. First, I imposed 
strongly rational expectations about the actual German and American inﬂation processes; this is 
a very strong form of rational expectations because it assumes that the agents know the entire 
histograms of these processes, except for a multiplicative constant that is interpreted as the 
precision of the prior belief. Thus one class of agents was given this prior for American 
inﬂation a1 ¼ ð0:02; 0:08; 0:67; 0:18; 0:05Þ0 and this prior for German inﬂation 0
a � ¼ ð0:02; 0:1; 0:7; 0:15; 0:03Þ . These priors correspond to the actual historical inﬂation pro­1 
cesses that occurred from January 1981 through December 1985, and both have unitary preci­
sion.14 Imposing that the other class of agents had the same priors up to a multiplicative 
constant, I used the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the two free precision param­
eters. In sum, I am imposing that b1 ¼ b3 ¼ 1 and then estimating b2 and b4 in the top half of 
Table 3. In the second case, agents had ‘‘adaptive expectations’’; their prior beliefs were based 
upon inﬂation histories during the 93 previous months from March 1973 to December 1980, the 
entire modern era of ﬂoating exchange rates. Hence in this second case, one class of agents was 
given these priors for American inﬂation a1 ¼ 93 � ð0; 0:05; 0:365; 0:365; 0:22Þ0 and these pri­0ors about German inﬂation a1 ¼ 93 � ð0:02; 0:23; 0:47; 0:2; 0:08Þ . The second class of agents 
had the same beliefs, but I again estimated two free precision parameters. Now I am imposing 
that b1 ¼ b3 ¼ 93 and then estimating b2 and b4 in the bottom half of Table 3. 
What is a good benchmark against which to judge the model? The simplest model of the 
forward rate imposes covered interest parity. Then the Fisher equation and the assumption of 
real interest rates equalization imply that: 
 � 	 
 f ðht; T � tÞ ¼ E pT �pT 	ht ; 
where E½pT jht� is the expected (annualized) domestic inﬂation rate between t and T. This ex­
pectation is taken with respect to the history ht, and the expectation E p 	ht is analogous T 
for the foreign country. Imposing that realized ex post inﬂation is the proper proxy for expected 
inﬂation, Fig. 2 graphs these simple predictions. The benchmark prediction at a one-month ho­
rizon is more volatile than that at 12 months because monthly price changes can be quite 
variable. 
14 The reader is reminded that beliefs with a precision of 1 are very diffuse. Indeed the ﬁrst monthly observation is 
given as much weight as the prior beliefs. On the other hand, beliefs of precision 100 imply that the entire history 
of 60 months is not more important than the priors brought to the market. 
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Fig. 2. Simple predictions (January 1981eDecember 1985). 
 00 0 0 0What is a simple measure of a model’s goodness of ﬁt? Let y ¼ y1; y2; y3; y be the 4 
stacked vector of the 240 observations on the forward premium at the four different horizons 00 0 0 0 y ¼ ðy1; y2; y3; yfor the ﬁve years under consideration, and let 4Þ be the corresponding predicted 
values. If one estimates k parameters, then the adjusted R2 is an adequate summary measure. 
This statistic gives equal weights to forecasts at each horizon. Its value for the benchmark modeld 
in which no parameter is estimateddis 0.22; thus actual ex post inﬂation explains very little of 
the variation in the actual forward premium, a fact that should be of no surprise to the empir­
ically oriented reader. 
Table 4 gives the estimates and model-ﬁt statistics from the Method of Simulated Moments. 
The Appendix gives my exact technique. Since the computation is very time consuming, I could 
only estimate two parameters. Because the Quasi-Newton numerical algorithm used for mini­
mization searches over all of two-dimensional real space, I estimated the model in logarithms. 
That transformation makes sense of negative estimates of the precision parameters. 
Four facts in Table 4 are worth emphasizing. First, even with only two free parameters, the 
model performs much better than the benchmark; this is not much of a surprise since covered 
interest parity is a real straw man. Second, imposing adaptive expectationsdthose based upon 
recent historydﬁts the data better than imposing strongly rational expectations. Third, there is 
some very weak evidence that the heterogeneity of prior beliefs does seem to matter. Fourth, the 
model’s two parameters are estimated very imprecisely, probably because there is much corre­
lation in the inﬂation data and the numerical techniques for estimating the relevant gradients are 
very imprecise in a model that is so highly non-linear. I conclude this subsection by reiterating 
Table 4
 
Method of Simulated Moments estimates, exponential transformation (standard errors are in parentheses)
 
Strongly rational expectations Bayesian adaptive expectations 
b1 b1h0 b1hlnð93Þ 
b^2 �18.6 (5.6 � 107) 24.2 (1.2 � 108) 
b^3 b3h0 b3hlnð93Þ 
b^4 14.7 (4.3 � 106) �10.1 (2.1 � 104) 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.81 
Table 5
 
Non-linear least squares estimates, exponential transformation (corrected asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses)
 
Strongly rational expectations Bayesian adaptive expectations 
b0 
b1 
b2 
b3 
b4 
^
^
^
^
^
�3.33 (0.0017) �3.40 (0.0018) 
�9.93 (19.0) 0.678 (1.43) 
�9.42 (0.0027) �5.964 (0.0405) 
�7.27 (0.00011) �1.83 (0.055) 
�23.7 (0.00081) 0.885 (0.587) 
Sum of squared errors 0.053 0.041 
Wald test for homogeneity of beliefs (the 4.41 � 108 39.44 
critical value is 9.21 for a test of size 1%.) 
that a plausible model of the forward premium can be calibrated and then estimated, and it ﬁts 
the data at least as well as the usual benchmark. There is weak preliminary evidence that the 
diversity of prior beliefs does indeed matter. 
5.4. Non-linear regressions 
Since the model is a complicated mapping from the parameters to predictions about the data, 
it is entirely appropriate to consider a non-linear regression. Let 
yt ¼ f ðxt; bÞ þ ut 
be such a speciﬁcation. Here yt is the forward premium, xt includes the history of inﬂation that 
is in the information set for the relevant forward premium, and b is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The interpretation of the error term ut is twofold. First, the discrete inﬂation processes 
impose aggregation errors. Second, a parsimonious parameterization will inevitably leave out 
some important factors that do indeed explain the forward premium. 
Thus my second group of regressions estimates the following model 
yt ¼ b0 þ f ðxt ; b1; b2; b3; b4Þ þ ut ; 
where a constant has been included to make sure that the error terms have the proper location 
and where the other four parameters are the precision of the prior beliefs of a class of agents 
about the American and German inﬂation processes. The Appendix describes the exact method 
I used for the non-linear estimation.15 
Table 5 reports the estimates, their standard errors, and the Wald statistics based upon the 
null hypothesis of homogeneous prior beliefs. Several comments are in order. First, these esti­
mates are much better than those based upon the Method of Simulated Moments. This is true in 
part because the econometric model includes a constant term. This term is estimated quite ac­
curately; the forward premium was roughly expð�3:33Þ ¼ 3:58% in the rational expectations 
case and expð�3:25Þ ¼ 3:88% in the adaptive expectations case. Second, the estimated 
15 Starting from a random initial condition, I used Gauss’s Quasi-Newton minimization routine to minimize the sum of 
squared errors. The objective function is ﬂat in a neighborhood of non-linear least squares estimates, and the model is 
identiﬁed only up to two symmetric classes of beliefs. I ran the program repeatedly until I was satisﬁed that I was in 
a neighborhood of a global minimum. Since the precision of anyone’s belief has to be a non-negative number, I actually 
estimate the model in logarithms. 
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Fig. 3. Model predictions with strongly rational expectations (January 1981eDecember 1985). 
coefﬁcients show that a model of learning for all agents matters in both cases because none of 
the estimated coefﬁcients is very large. The highest estimate of a precision parameter is for the 
ﬁrst class of agents in the adaptive expectations case. One class believed that American inﬂa­
tion of the late 1970s was going to persist, but they did so only with a precision 
expð0:885Þ ¼ 2:42. The meaning of this number is that one class of agents took around two 
and a half months to start to give signiﬁcant weight to the in-sample data about inﬂation real­
izations. Third, the model based upon adaptive expectations does better than the one based 
upon strongly rational expectations. Thus the data have strong evidence in favor of the notion 
that the inﬂation history of the 1970s inﬂuenced beliefs in 1981.16 
Figs. 3 and 4 show the model’s predictions. Let me concentrate on Fig. 3 ﬁrst; this is the 
model with strongly rational expectations. There are two salient characteristics of these pre­
dicted values. First, the initial periods show a very large forward premium. Second, after 
a while, the model predicts essentially a constant forward premium. The implication is that 
the diversity of prior beliefs matters the most in the initial periods; these are the periods during 
which the assets will trade back and forth between the different classes of agents. It is worth 
exploring the actual inﬂation history of 1981 to show why the model predicts a change in di­
rection after September 1981. The ﬁrst nine months of the U.S. inﬂation history have eight 
events in the 11% bin and one in the 14% bin. The 10th event falls in the 5% bin, and this 
causes investors to begin to change beliefs about American inﬂation radically. The 23rd month 
of the data also marks a milestone, and this is where there are twice as many events in the 0% 
bin (four) as in the 14% bin (two). Thus the model seems to indicate that the market learned that 
the Volcker disinﬂation was credible in December 1982. After this, the diversity of beliefs does 
not seem to matter. 
I performed a Cox test for non-nested models. Using the null that the model with strongly rational expectations is 
true, I can resoundingly reject the estimates from the model with adaptive expectations. Under the alternative, I equally 
strongly reject the estimates from the model with strongly rational expectations. These two rejections are not surprising, 
since it is likely that the true model involves more than two classes of agents. 
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Fig. 4. Model predictions with Bayesian adaptive expectations (January 1981eDecember 1985). 
Fig. 4 tells a similar story; this ﬁgure captures the predictions from the model with Bayesian 
adaptive expectations. The initial months in which the dollar traded forwarded at a discount re­
ﬂect the inertial effects of higher inﬂation in the United States in the 1970s. The change in the 
forward premium after the summer of 1981 corresponds to the ﬁrst realization of German inﬂa­
tion that falls in the 4% bin; in the ﬁrst few months of 1981, there had been fairly signiﬁcant 
German inﬂation. After that event, the heterogeneity of beliefs does not seem to matter much. 
Let me conclude this subsection with a brief summary. This is the ﬁrst time that any economic 
model with diverse prior beliefs has been brought to the data. There is evidence in favor of two 
salient facts: (1) learning matters for a proper model of the forward premium; and (2) a model 
with one homogeneous agent misses an important element of the data. The diversity of prior 
beliefs matters most in the early periods of the model; this makes a lot of sense because sooner 
or later the actual data will overwhelm any sensible prior beliefs that are brought into a new 
inﬂation regime. This is the fundamental empirical contribution of my work. 
5.5. The model and the forward premium anomaly 
The empirical discussion so far has avoided the obvious question: Do the predictions also ex­
hibit the forward premium anomaly? In one sense, this query is a straw man because the model 
imposes the Procrustean requirement that the spot exchange rate satisfy purchasing power parity 
in every period. Still, there are good theoretical reasons for which the anomaly will arise in this 
model. Table 6 shows output from the regressions based upon the typical speciﬁcation: 
ðetþ1 � et Þ ¼ g0 þ g1ð ft � etÞ þ utþ1; 
Table 6
 
Forward premium anomaly in the model’s predictions (t-statistics values are in parentheses)
 
g^0 g^1 
Strongly rational expectations case 0.001 (0.92) �0.004 (�31.4)
 
Bayesian adaptive expectations case 0.0005 (0.25) 0.014 (�25.9)
 
where all variables are in logarithms, etþ1 � et is the depreciation of the spot exchange rate 
ft � et is the model’s predicted one-period forward premium, and utþ1 is an error term not in 
the information set at time t. The numbers in parentheses in that table are the t-statistics based 
upon the null hypotheses that g0 ¼ 0 and g1 ¼ 1. The standard NeweyeWest correction has 
been applied to this regression, and I used a lag of 13. There is overwhelming evidence that 
these calibrations exhibit the forward premium anomaly, although the estimates of g1 are 
not as negative as in some other studies. 
The main reason that the model’s predictions show the forward premium anomaly is that, 
after about a year, the predicted forward premium becomes largely stable. Thus a high inﬂation 
realization doesn’t move the forward premium very much, but it does cause a depreciation of 
the spot exchange rate because of the model’s strong assumption about a constant real exchange 
rate. Hence there is little correlation between realizations of the spot exchange rate and the for­
ward premium. Since the way the spot exchange rate is modeled is so artiﬁcial, I do not attach 
much importance to the fact that the estimated model exhibits the anomaly. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a new theory of the forward premium based upon a model that 
takes heterogeneity in ﬁnancial markets seriously. The model has striking predictions for the 
forward premium; it shows that diverse beliefs about a country’s inﬂation process make its cur­
rency trade forward at a premium in contracts whose horizons are greater than one month. The 
calibration of the model is perhaps plausible, but it predicts perhaps too much learning. Still, 
the notion that agents had diverse beliefs about monetary policy and doubted that inﬂation 
could be abated at the beginning of the 1981 is indeed intuitive. 
My primary empirical contribution is that I actually estimate the precision with which dif­
ferent classes of agents in the world economy held plausible prior beliefs. There is evidence in 
these data that a model with one agent is just not an accurate description of world asset markets. 
This is the ﬁrst time that an extension of the elegant models based upon Harrison and Kreps 
(1978) and Morris (1996) has been taken to the data, and my work shows that these authors 
were quite right to worry about diversity of beliefs in ﬁnancial markets. 
The model has many weaknesses. First and foremost, it is ludicrous to impose that the real 
exchange rate is constant. My only defense is that a good model of the spot exchange rate is left 
to those with superior analytical powers. Another important weakness is that the model assumes 
that inﬂation process in each country is independently and identically distributed. Inﬂation is 
obviously correlated between countries and across time, but this fact is difﬁcult to incorporate 
into an analytically tractable model with Bayesian learning. The calibrations and estimates are 
suggestive but not exhaustive. Again, my defense is that there is no other study in international 
ﬁnance that takes a structural model with heterogeneous priors and Bayesian learning to the 
data. So this empirical work is just a ﬁrst step. 
In an important sense, my model is a better description of term structure than it is of the 
forward premium.17 Most empirical analyses of the yield curve show that the expectations hy­
pothesis of the term structure is not true; the spreads between certain long rates and short rates 
do not predict future short rates. Rudebusch (1995) argues that the monetary authority’s policy 
distorts bond prices at the short end of the yield curve. My model offers an alternative avenue 
17 This paragraph was inspired by a referee’s comments. 
worthy of exploration; future researchers can analyze the effect of heterogeneity of beliefs on 
the yield curve in a national bond market. 
Perhaps this paper will spur other researchers in international ﬁnance to investigate models 
with heterogeneous beliefs. It is remarkable that the ‘‘forward discount anomaly’’ can be ex­
plained so easily in a model with risk-neutral agents. It is essential that we economists be care­
ful in our interpretations of the notion of rational expectations as an equilibrium concept. 
Models with heterogeneous prior beliefs are more general than the usual ones with one repre­
sentative agent. The equilibria described in this paper all converge to the ‘‘rational expectations 
equilibrium’’ if agents’ priors are well behaved. And the typical model used in international 
ﬁnance is a special case of the one that has been explored; after all, one can always impose 
that everyone’s perfectly precise priors agreed with the actual distribution of inﬂation. But in­
formational heterogeneity and limited short selling surely characterize actual ﬁnancial markets. 
So it would be nice to continue building models that incorporate these obvious facts. 
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Appendix 
Here is how I constructed the Method of Simulated Moments estimators. I used the fact that 
the order of the inﬂation events in a Bayesian model should not matter since I have assumed the 
natural conjugate priors. Hence, any history that satisﬁes the ﬁnal empirical distribution of in­
ﬂation events in Germany and the United States was equally likely. (Again, I am relying heavily 
on the assumption of independent inﬂation events in each month!) So I drew 50 such random 
ﬁve-year histories f ~~h60ð1Þ; .; h60ð50Þg, each element consisting of an entire ﬁve-year history 
of inﬂation for the two countries. 
Then I essentially followed the technique given in Davidson and Mackinnon (2004, chapter 
09.6). Let b ¼ ðb2; b4Þ be the vector of precisions to be estimated from Table 3, and let y 
240�1 
be the appropriately stacked vector of data on the forward premia. It is convenient to write 
z as the vector of squared values of these data. For a given vector of parameters 
240�1 
s ˛f1; .; 50g gives 
ðb; sÞ. Let 
b ¼ ðb2; b4Þ#, each simulated history predictions for these data 
^y^ z 
240�1240�1 
50 50 X X 
ðb; sÞ and their squared values
myðbÞ ¼ ð1=50Þ ðb; sÞ and mzðbÞ ¼ ð1=50Þ ^y^ z 
240�1240�1s¼1 s¼1 
ðb; sÞ 
    
       
   
  

   
    
        
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be the predicted moments for a given vector of parameters. Now consider the natural weighting 
matrix w ¼ I25 i and the quadratic form 
240�1  T   
y �myðbÞ y �myðbÞ QðbÞ ¼  w : 
z �mzðbÞ z �mzðbÞ 
b that minimizes QðbÞ
be the two (row-vector) gradients evaluated at the estimate, 
^The Method of Simulated Moments estimator is the vector . 
b b 
and write U ¼ Syz5I240, where Syz is the varianceecovariance matrix of the data ðy; zÞ#. 
Finally 
^^Now let Vmy and Vmz 
�1�1 T 
b b 
b 
b b 
^
^
gives the varianceecovariance matrix of the Method of Simulated Moments estimator. 
Here is how I did the non-linear estimation. I followed the procedure in Judge et al. (1982, 
chapter 24). The ﬁrst step is to minimize the sum of squared errors between the model’s pre­
dictions and the data; I used the data at all four horizons because the model has predictions for 
^
^
^
(1987) correction. The last step is to test the hypothesis that there is no heterogeneity of prior 
^
each horizon, given the inﬂation history. The second is evaluate the gradient step to 
ð Þ ¼ ð ð Þ ð Þ Þ the estimated coefﬁcients and each of the f f fV b b b b b at; ; ; ; ;x x = x =v v v v.0 4t t t
240 data points. The inner product of the resulting 240 � 5 matrix gives the variance covari-e
ance matrix of the estimated parameters. Because this is a model of Bayesian learning, the error 
terms in this model are not independent across time, nor are they independent across the dif-
ferent horizons at which foreign exchange is traded forwarded. So the third step corrected 
the standard from the non-linear least estimates using the Newey West eerrors squares 
beliefs in these data. It is natural Wald based the statisticto testuse a upon 
b 
Vmy Vmy  T T¼ Uwv w w w 
Vmz Vmz 
0 �1
b^ RVR0W ¼ , where R R
^^^^^
0 1  �1 0 0  0 
Rb ¼ b ¼ 
0 0 0  1  �1 0 
captures the two linear restrictions stating that the precisions of beliefs about American inﬂa­
tion are identical and so are the precisions having to do with German inﬂation. The variancee 
�1 �10 0 
covariance matrix V ¼ ½ � G½ � , where Vf is the Vf Vf Vf Vf 
^
b b b b b 
‘‘stacked’’ 240 � 5 gradient evaluated at the estimates and the data and G is the Neweye 
b 
x; x; x; x; x; 
West correction, constructed from correlations between Vf and the data at various lags. x; 
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